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Abstract
This paper investigates a simultaneous move capacity constrained
price competition game among three ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that equilibria in
an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially diﬀerent from those in a
duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. I characterize mixed strategy equi-
libria and show there exist possibilities of i) the existence of a contin-
uum of equilibria ii) the smallest ﬁrm earning the largest proﬁt per
capacity and iii) non-identical supports of equilibrium mixed strate-
gies, all of which never arise either in the duopoly or in the symmetric
oligopoly. In particular, the second ﬁnding sheds light on a completely
new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions.
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1 Introduction
While the notion of price competition is simple and of a long history, the
research of homogeneous products has been limited, i.e., full characteriza-
tions of equilibria are not generally available. That is probably because of
a mathematical diﬃculty, the discontinuity of payoﬀ function, which cause
non-existence of pure equilibrium. This paper investigates a capacity con-
strained price game among three ﬁrms in a homogeneous goods market with
eﬃcient rationing rule, and shows substantial diﬀerences between a duopoly
and (asymmetric) oligopoly.
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) analyze
the duopolistic version of my model and fully characterize the equilibrium.
Although there exist a number of subsequent papers which examine oligopoly,
all of them have some crucial additional assumptions and thus their scope
is quite restricted. Brock and Scheinkman (1985) consider a repeated price
game in a general N ﬁrms oligopoly and specify the equilibrium payoﬀs in
the stage game (i.e., one shot price game), but they assume all ﬁrms have
identical capacity. Vives (1986) proves that the support of equilibrium prices
converges to the competitive price, but he also assumes symmetric capacity
and takes the limit as the number of ﬁrms goes inﬁnity. Boccard and Wauthy
(2000) and De Francesco (2003) consider a two stage game a´ la Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) with ﬁnite number of asymmetric ﬁrms, but they examine
only the largest ﬁrm’s payoﬀ and incentive in the price competition stage. 1
1The situation for price competition under convex costs is similar. Characterization of
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Thus, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to characterize the equilibrium pay-
oﬀs of all ﬁrms in a ﬁnite and asymmetric oligopoly. The reason why such
an attempt has not been made may be as follows. The incentive of the
largest ﬁrm is easy to characterise in the same way as a duopoly, and strong
enough to investigate, for example, the subgame perfect equilibria of two
stage models a´ la Kreps and Scheinkman. In other words, the largest ﬁrm
has the strongest incentive to set a high price in either a duopoly or oligopoly,
since its residual demand (market demand minus opponents’ capacity) is the
largest. Thus one might expect that other properties of the duopolistic equi-
librium will also be extended to an oligopoly. In an asymmetric oligopoly,
however, I show below that the smallest ﬁrm can have a special incentive to
raise its price that never appears in the duopoly nor, of course, symmetric
oligopoly. I also prove that a continuum of equilibria can exist whereas equi-
librium is unique in the duopoly. In addition, the possibility that ﬁrms have
heterogeneous supports of equilibrium strategies is also a departure from the
duopoly. Three ﬁrms are enough to show the departures from the duopoly
and gives important insights about the oligopoly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we explain our model and
introduce notations in Section 2, present the characterizations of equilibria
in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4.
equilibrium is not available, though existence of (mixed strategy) equilibrium is proved
by Dixon (1984). See Dixon (1987) and Chowdhury (2007) for examples of research with
additional assumptions.
3
2 The Model
I consider the following game. The set of the ﬁrms is I = f1; 2; 3g. Firm i’s
strategy is its price, i.e., its strategy space is given by Si = R+ for all i 2 I.
For each ﬁrm i, let Ki > 0 denote the production capacity and suppose
K1 ¸ K2 ¸ K3 without loss of generality. I assume each ﬁrm has identical
constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zero. The payoﬀ function for
player i is given by
¼i(p) = pi ¢max
0@0;min
8<:Ki;
Ã
D(pi)¡
P
jjpj<pi
Kj
!0@Ki= X
ljpl=pi
Kl
1A9=;
1A ;
where p = (p1; p2; p3) and D is the demand function described below.
2 I
impose two common assumptions on the demand function.
Assumption 1:
There exists P¯ such that D(p) = 0 if and only if p ¸ P¯ . D is strictly
decreasing on [0; P¯ ].
Assumption 2:
D is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and concave on [0; P¯ ].
Here I introduce some more notations. Let K := K1 +K2 +K3, K¡i :=
K¡Ki,Kij = Ki+Kj, p˜i := argmaxp p(D(p)¡K¡i), and ¼˜i := maxp p(D(p)¡
K¡i). Notice that p˜i is uniquely determined because of Assumption 2.
2The payoﬀ function represents the so-called eﬃcient rationing scheme. For examples of
research with non-eﬃcient rationings, see Allen and Hellwig (1986, 1993) and Chowdhury
(2003, 2007). Again, equilibria with these rationings are characterized only in the duopoly
or limit cases.
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When there exists a pure strategy equilibrium, its properties are almost
the same as those in the duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. That is, a pure
equilibrium exists if and only if the largest ﬁrm has no incentive to raise its
price at the competitive price (D¡1(minfK;D(0)g)), and market demand is
fully met at that price. Since the objective of this paper is to point out sub-
stantial diﬀerences between the duopoly and asymmetric oligopoly, I make
another assumption in order to rule out pure equilibria.
Assumption 3: p˜1 > D
¡1(minfD(0); Kg).
Even when no pure equilibrium exists, existence of mixed strategy equi-
librium is guaranteed by Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Let
(F1(¢); F2(¢); F3(¢)) denote an equilibrium triple of distribution functions (i.e.,
mixed strategies), and deﬁne ai = inf suppFi, bi = sup suppFi, a = mini ai,
and b = maxi bi. In the duopoly, Osborne and Pitchik (1986) show that i)
the equilibrium is unique, ii) the equilibrium payoﬀs are given by (¼¤1; ¼
¤
2) =
(a¤minfD(a¤); K1g; a¤K2), where ¼¤i is payoﬀ of i at the equilibrium and a¤
is the unique solution to ¼˜1 = a
¤minfD(a¤); K1g, and iii) F1 and F2 have
identical supports [a; b] = [a¤; p˜1] and ¼i(p;Fj) = ¼¤i (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j) for
all p 2 [a¤; p˜1). Hence the following conjecture will seem natural in a three
ﬁrms oligopoly.
Conjecture:
i) the equilibrium is unique,
ii) the equilibrium payoﬀs are (¼¤1; ¼
¤
2; ¼
¤
3) = (a
¤minfD(a¤); K1g; a¤K2; a¤K3)
where a¤ is the unique solution to ¼˜1 = a¤minfD(a¤); K1g, and
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iii) F1, F2 and F3 have identical supports [a; b] = [a
¤; p˜1] and ¼i(p;F¡i) = ¼¤i
(i = 1; 2; 3) for all p 2 [a¤; p˜1).
I show below that any part of the conjecture does not generally hold.
3 Results
First we show some useful lemmas which generally hold either in the duopoly
or oligopoly. Similar results are frequently used in the literature.
Lemma 1:
There exists i such that bi = p˜i = b and ¼
¤
i = ¼˜i.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let IH := fi 2 Ijbi = bg. If IH = fig for some i, the statement obviously
holds for that i.
Thus, consider the case where jIH j > 2. We ﬁrst show b is an atom of Fi
for at most one ﬁrm. To see this, suppose b is an atom of Fi and Fj (i 6= j). By
deﬁnition of equilibrium ¼¤i = ¼i(b;F¡i), where ¼i(p;F¡i) is i’s expected proﬁt
given the distributions of opponents prices when it sets a price p. Firm i has
an incentive to lower its price (i.e. limp%b ¼i(b;F¡i) > ¼¤i ) if D(b) < K and
to raise its price (i.e. limp&b ¼i(b;F¡i) > ¼¤i ) if D(b) > K. Thus D(b) = K is
the only possible case. This contradicts, however, Assumption 3 that ﬁrm 1
has an incentive to raise its price at D¡1(K).
If b is an atom only of Fi, that i must satisfy the statement. If b is not
an atom for any Fi, the statement must hold for all i = 1; 2; 3. ¥
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Lemma 2:
If the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisﬁed for i, then ai = a.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Suppose there exists j such that aj < ai. Since ai · bi = p˜i, it must be that
D(ai) > K¡i and thus ¼j(p;F¡j) is increasing on [0; ai), a contradiction. ¥
Lemma 3:
If the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisﬁed for i, then Ki = K1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Notice that Ki is unique by lemma 1 and the deﬁnition of p˜i, though i may
not be. Suppose that Ki < K1, which implies D(ai) ¸ D(bi) > K¡i > K¡1.
Then, a = ai = a1 must hold, because otherwise pi 2 [ai; a1) is strictly
dominated by pi = a1. Since ¼i(a;F¡i) = ¼¤i = ¼i(b;F¡i), a = b(D(b) ¡
K¡i)=Ki. Then, however,
¼¤1 ¡ ¼˜i =¼1(a;F¡1)¡ ¼˜1
·aK1 ¡ b(D(b)¡K¡1)
=(b=Ki)(D(b)¡K)(K1 ¡Ki) < 0;
which is a contradiction to the equilibrium condition. ¥
These Lemmas present the incentive of the largest ﬁrm that we discussed
in the previous sections. In what follows, I assume ﬁrm 1 satisﬁes the condi-
tions in Lemma 1 without loss of generality.
Next we characterize mixed strategy equilibria. Note that Lemmas 1-3
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imply a = a¤ and b = b¤ in any equilibrium, where a¤ is the unique solution
to ¼˜1 = a
¤minfa¤; D(a¤)g and b¤ = p˜1. It is clear that there exists i 6= 1 such
that ai = a1 = a
¤ so that ﬁrm 1 does not have an incentive to raise its price
from a1. This condition can pin down the unique equilibrium in the duopoly,
but not in the oligopoly. We need to distribute cases by the relations among
Ki’s and D(a
¤) in our oligopolistic model.
The ﬁrst is the case in which K1 is very large relatively to K2 and K3.
Claim 1:
If D(a¤) < K1, we can construct a continuum of equilibria, but the equilib-
rium payoﬀ is unique (¼¤2; ¼
¤
3) = (a
¤K2; a¤K3).
Proof of Claim 1:
First I show how to construct a continuum of equilibria in which (¼¤2; ¼
¤
3) =
(a¤K2; a¤K3). Note that, if D(p) · K1 and p is not an atom of F1,
¼i(p;F¡i) = (1¡ F1(p))pKi (i 6= 1) (1)
which depends only on F1. Hence, taking F1(p) = 1¡ (a¤=p) for p 2 [a¤; b¤),
equilibrium conditions for ﬁrms 2 and 3 are obviously satisﬁed. Any pair of
non-atomic F2 and F3 which satisﬁes
¼1(p;F2; F3) = ¼
¤
1(= a
¤D(a¤))
for all p 2 [a¤; b¤] forms an equilibrium. Since only one condition is imposed
on two variables, we can take a continuum of (F2(¢); F3(¢)).
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Next we prove (¼¤2; ¼
¤
3) = (a
¤K2; a¤K3) in any equilibrium. Notice that F1
must be non-atomic on [a¤; b¤). To see why, suppose p¯ 2 [a¤; b¤) is an atom
of F1. It implies that, for i 2 f2; 3g, limp%p¯ ¼i(p;F¡i) < ¼i(p¯;F¡i) and thus
Fi(p¯+ ²) = Fi(p¯) for suﬃciently small but strictly positive ². Then, however,
it follows by Assumption 2 that ¼1(p;F¡1) > ¼1(p¯;F¡1) for p 2 (p¯; p¯+²) which
contradicts the assumption p¯ is an atom of equilibrium strategy F1. There-
fore F1 is non-atomic on [a
¤; b¤) and ¼¤2=K2 = ¼
¤
3=K3 since suppF2 \ suppF3
must not be empty by the same logic as above. Moreover, there must exist
i 2 f2; 3g such that ai = a¤ and ¼¤i = a¤Ki, and the statement on the payoﬀs
must hold obviously. ¥
Notice that exactly the same logic will hold even when there are more than
three ﬁrms. That is, our three ﬁrms setting is not restrictive in this result.
Note that we can construct equilibria so that supports of Fi’s are heteroge-
neous, i.e., not only part i) but also part iii) of Conjecture fails. See appendix
for example.
The second is the case where K1; K2 and K3 are relatively close to each
other. The symmetric capacities case, in which K1 = K2 = K3, must be
included here.
Claim 2:
If K1 +K2 · D(a¤), a2 = a3 = a¤ and (¼¤2; ¼¤3) = (a¤K2; a¤K3).
Proof of Claim 2:
If there exists i 2 I n f1g such that ai > a¤, ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to raise
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its price from a¤.3 Thus ai = a¤ for all i.
It is obvious that ¼¤i = a
¤Ki if a¤ is an atom of Fi. Even if not, combining
the equilibrium condition
lim
p&a¤
¼i(p;F¡i) = ¼¤i ¸ lim
p%a¤
¼i(p;F¡i)
and the fact
lim
p&a¤
¼i(p;F¡i) · a¤Ki = lim
p%a¤
¼i(p;F¡i)
also yields ¼¤i = a
¤Ki. ¥
Notice that this result is also expendable to a general N ﬁrms oligopoly.
Suppose there are N ﬁrms with K1 ¸ K2 ¸ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¸ KN . If D(a¤) > K¡N ,
ai = a
¤ and ¼¤i = a
¤Ki for all i. Claim 2 exhibits a natural extension of the
duopoly, but equilibria quite diﬀerent from Conjecture can arise even when
D(a¤) > K1.
The next is the case in which K3 is very small relatively to K1 and K2.
Parts ii) and iii) of Conjecture fail here.
Claim 3:
If K1 +K3 · D(a¤) < K1 +K2, a3 > a2 = a¤ and ¼¤3=K3 > ¼¤2=K2 = a¤.
Proof of Claim 3:
Notice that a1 = a2 = a
¤ must be satisﬁed in the equilibrium so that ﬁrm
1 does not strictly prefer a¤ + ² to a¤. In addition, a¤ is not an atom of
F1 or F2, since, if a
¤ is an atom of Fi (i = 1; 2), ¼¤j = limp&a¤ ¼j(p;F¡j) <
3Even when K1 +K2 = D(a¤), Assumption 2 guarantees this.
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limp%a¤ ¼j(p;F¡j) (j 2 f1; 2g n fig).
These imply that a2 = a
¤ and ¼¤2 = a
¤K2. If a3 = a¤ and F3 is right-
increasing at a¤,
¼2(p;F¡2) = ¼¤2 , (1¡ F1) + F1(1¡ F3)
D ¡K1
K2
+ F1F3
D ¡K12
K2
=
a¤
p
¼3(p;F¡3) = ¼¤3 , (1¡ F1F2) =
a¤
p
must be satisﬁed for p 2 (a¤; a¤+²) where ² is a small positive number. Thus,
solving the second equation, we get
F1 =
1¡ (a¤=p)
F2
;
for p 2 (a¤; a¤ + ²). Substituting this into the ﬁrst equation,
F3 =
K2
K3
F2 +
D ¡K12
K3
:
Since F2 & 0 as p& a¤, however,
lim
p&a¤
F3 =
D(a¤)¡K12
K3
< 0;
a contradiction to the deﬁnition of distribution function. Therefore we can
conclude that a3 > a
¤ or F3 is not right-increasing at a¤.
Next suppose that a3 > a
¤ and ¼¤3 = a
¤K3. Solving ¼1(a;F¡1)=K1 =
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¼2(a;F¡2)=K2 = a¤, we get
F1F2 = K1K2
µ
1¡ (a¤=p)
K12 ¡D
¶2
;
for p 2 (a¤; a¤ + ²). If ﬁrm 3 sets p3 = p , it can earn
¼3(p;F¡3) = (1¡ F1F2)pK3:
Equilibrium condition ¼3(p;F¡3) · ¼¤3 = a¤K3 implies that
1¡ F1F2 · (a¤=p)
must be satisﬁed for p 2 (a¤; a3). Since 1 ¡ (a¤=p) > 0 for p > a¤, the
inequality is equivalent to
1 · F1F2
1¡ (a¤=p) = K1K2
1¡ (a¤=p)
(K12 ¡D)2 ;
which cannot hold as p & a¤. That is, if ¼¤3 = a¤K3 ﬁrm 3 has an incentive
to set a price lower than a3, a contradiction. Thus a3 > a
¤ and ¼¤3 > a
¤K3,
or a3 = a
¤ and F3 is not right-increasing at a¤.
If a3 = a
¤ and F3 is not right-increasing at a¤, a similar contradiction
(ﬁrm 3 has a strict incentive to set higher price than a¤) occurs since F1 and
F2 will be smaller than the above speciﬁcation. ¥
The intuition behind Claim 3 is simple, but completely new in the liter-
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ature. The smallest ﬁrm cannot sell a lot even if it charges the lowest price.
Thus the ratio of residual demand (D¡K¡i) to capacity (Ki) is the largest for
the smallest ﬁrm. This property gives the smallest ﬁrm an incentive to raise
its price despite raising price also raises the probability of being undercut.
Such an incentive can never appear in a duopoly, because the smaller ﬁrm’s
behavior is determined solely by the equilibrium condition for the larger ﬁrm.
Following Claims 4 and 5 on intermediate cases are just combinations of
Claims 1-3.
Claim 4:
If K1 < D(a
¤) < K3 and K2 > K3, a3 > a2 = a¤ and ¼¤3=K3 > ¼2=K2 = a
¤ or
there exists a continuum of equilibria in any of which ¼¤2=K2 = ¼
¤
3=K3 = a
¤.
Proof of Claim 4:
First we show that a3 > a
¤ if a2 = a¤. By way of contradiction, suppose
a2 = a3 = a
¤. Notice that a¤ cannot be an atom of any Fi in this case. The
same as in the proof of Claim 3,
¼2(p;F¡2) = ¼¤2 , (1¡ F1) + F1(1¡ F3)
D ¡K1
K2
=
a¤
p
¼3(p;F¡3) = ¼¤3 , (1¡ F1) + F1(1¡ F2)
D ¡K1
K2
=
a¤
p
must hold for p 2 (a¤; a¤ + ²). Solving the second equation and substituting
into the ﬁrst, we get
F3 =
K2
K3
F2 +
K2
D ¡K1
µ
K1 ¡D
K3
+
D ¡K1
K2
¶
:
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Again, as p& a¤,
F3 ! K2
D(a¤)¡K1
µ
K1 ¡D(a¤)
K3
+
D(a¤)¡K1
K2
¶
< 0;
a contradiction.
Next we consider the case in which a2 > a
¤. Then it must be satisﬁed
that a3 = a
¤ and ¼¤3 = a
¤K3. By way of contradiction, suppose D(a2) < K1.
Equilibrium condition for ﬁrm 3 implies
¼3(a2;F¡3) = a2[(1¡F1(a2))K3+F1(D(a2)¡K1)] · a¤K3 = lim
p%a¤
¼3(p;F¡3):
However,
¼2(a2;F¡2) < a2[(1¡F1(a2))K2+F1(D(a2)¡K1)] < a¤K2 = lim
p%a¤
¼2(p;F¡2):
That is, ﬁrm 2 has a strict incentive to set a¤ (or slightly below), a contradic-
tion. Therefore we can conclude that if a2 > a
¤ in equilibrium, D(a2) · K1.
This implies that ¼¤2=K2 = ¼
¤
3=K3 = a
¤ by the same logic as Claim 1. Fur-
thermore, if D¡1(K1)(K1 ¡ K3) < ¼¤1, we can construct a continuum of
equilibria in the same way as Claim 1. 4 ¥
Claim 5:
If K1 < D(a
¤) < K3 and K2 = K3, there can exist a continuum of equilib-
rium, but (¼¤2; ¼
¤
3) = (a
¤K2; a¤K3) in any equilibrium.
4If D¡1(K1)(K1 ¡K3) = ¼¤1 , we can construct only one equilibrium in which a2 > a¤,
but this is a degenerate case and a continuum of equilibrium generically exists.
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Proof of Claim 5:
By the same logic as in the proof of Claim 4, a contradiction occurs if
ai > aj and D(ai) > K1 (i; j = 2; 3 i 6= j). Thus we can conclude that
a2 = a3 = a
¤ or ai > aj and D(ai) · K1. In either case, it is obvious that
¼¤2 = ¼
¤
3 = a
¤K2 = a¤K3. If D¡1(K1)(K1 ¡ K3) < ¼¤1, we can construct a
continuum of equilibria again, by the same way as Claims 1 and 4. ¥
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates a model of price competition in an oligopolistic ho-
mogeneous goods market. Our main contributions are presented in Claims
1 and 3, which clearly exhibit the diﬀerences between a duopoly and asym-
metric oligopoly. I ﬁnd the possibilities of i) the existence of a continuum
of equilibria, ii) the smallest ﬁrm earning the highest per capacity proﬁt,
and iii) heterogeneous supports of equilibrium strategies. All of them seem
interesting in the sense that they cannot arise in the duopoly. In particu-
lar, the second possibility (Claim 3) sheds new light on pricing incentives in
Bertrand competition. That is, small capacity has relatively small loss in
demand by setting a higher price and thus relatively higher incentive to set
a higher price.
In addition, Claim 3 implies an interesting comparative statics. Suppose
the condition of Claim 3 holds. That is, in the equilibrium, ﬁrm 3 earns
the greatest per capacity proﬁt. Then, it will not be strange that ﬁrm 2
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considers to merge ﬁrm 3 in order to compete with ﬁrm 1. However, when
they actually merge the joint proﬁt will be strictly smaller than before the
merger if K1 > K2 +K3.
Finally we note on the limitation of our setting. We only consider the
oligopoly among three ﬁrms. As mentioned in the previous section, Claims
1 and 2 can be easily extended to a general N ﬁrms oligopoly. However, it
is hard to generalize Claims 3-5, because how to distribute cases depends on
each speciﬁc N . Though it remains for future research to explore a new logic
to characterize equilibria in a more general setting, three is enough to show
the departure from the duopoly.
A. 1 Example of A Continuum of Equilibria
D(p) = 1¡p, K1 = 1 and K2 = K3 = 1=4. Then (a¤; p˜1) = ((2¡
p
3)=4; 1=4)
and ¼˜1 = 1=16. For example, a triple (F1; F2; F3) such that
F1(p) =
8>><>>:
1¡ a1
p
for p 2 [2¡
p
3
4
; 1
4
)
1 for p = 1
4
F2(p) =
8>><>>:
1
4p
(¡16p2 + 16p¡ 1) for p 2 [2¡
p
3
4
; 3¡
p
5
8
]
1 for p 2 [3¡
p
5
8
; 1
4
]
16
F3(p) =
8>><>>:
0 for p 2 [2¡
p
3
4
; 3¡
p
5
8
]
1
4p
(¡16p2 + 12p¡ 1) for p 2 [3¡
p
5
8
; 1
4
]
consists an equilibrium.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
For another example, the same F1 as above and F2 = F3 = F such that
F (p) =
1
8p
(¡16p2 + 16p¡ 1) for p 2 [2¡
p
3
4
;
1
4
] ,
i.e., the solution to the equilibrium condition for ﬁrm 1
p
·
(1¡ p)(1¡ F )2 + 2
µ
3
4
¡ p
¶
F (1¡ F ) +
µ
1
2
¡ p
¶
F 2
¸
=
1
16
;
consist another equilibrium.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
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Figure 1: Distribution functions of the ﬁrst equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Distribution functions of the second equilibrium.
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